Nvidia’s Succession Plan Was Jensen Huang
Jensen Huang once told a Stanford audience that picking possible successors “in the case that I get run over by a bus” was “a toxic, toxic process.” Unfortunately, Nvidia’s board just discovered what the alternative looks like.
On November 8, Huang admitted an affair with Alice Huang (no relation), an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore company accused of funneling Nvidia chips to China to bypass U.S. export controls. Also, not for nothing, a suspected spy for Beijing. Nvidia’s board opened an investigation, initially saying it had confidence in its CEO. By Thursday he was gone, with CFO Colette Kress installed as interim CEO and director Harvey Jones as Nvidia’s first-ever board chair.
The spy angle drew headlines. What reportedly turned the board, though, was a Times report of a second affair with an executive who reported directly to Huang. Such liaisons, however cliché, have impacted several CEOs in recent years. HP fired Mark Hurd in 2010 over undisclosed use of company funds and a “close personal relationship” with a contractor. Intel’s Brian Krzanich resigned in 2018 over a past relationship with an employee. Nestlé dismissed Laurent Freixe in 2025 over a relationship with a direct subordinate. Kohl’s dismissed Ashley Buchanan in 2025 for steering business to a romantic partner. McDonald’s faced several years of legal and governance issues following Steve Easterbrook’s departure. It fired him in 2019, sued after learning of other relationships, and recovered more than $105 million. The SEC later charged him with misleading investors about his exit.
Yale business school professor Jeffrey Sonnenfeld said Nvidia’s board did the right thing, “but it has taken too long.” Boards may hesitate to remove a founder when they believe the company lacks a viable successor, and Nvidia’s board had good reason to be scared. It had the power to act at any time: Huang owned only about 3.6% of the stock and owned no extra voting rights. What the board lacked was an understudy. Huang ran the company with as many as 60 direct reports and no clear second-in-command, a setup that a Santa Clara University professor told Fortune “had the effect of suppressing the emergence of potential successors.” The board’s own makeup also favored deference, given its members’ long ties to Huang. It had no chair. Its lead independent director once ran the law firm that served as Nvidia’s main outside counsel. Two other directors had served alongside Huang since 1993.
A prepared board can move faster. Nestlé named longtime executive Philipp Navratil CEO the same day it dismissed Freixe. Apple went further and demo-ed its successor years before it needed him. When Steve Jobs told employees in 2004 that he’d had surgery for pancreatic cancer, he said Tim Cook would run day-to-day operations while he recovered. Cook filled in again during Jobs’ medical leaves in 2009 and 2011; when he became CEO in August 2011, he had already run Apple three times.
Shareholders can push boards on this issue. Since the SEC staff issued Staff Legal Bulletin 14E in 2009, companies generally have not been able to exclude CEO succession proposals from the proxy as ordinary business; a 2011 proposal asking Apple to adopt and report on a succession policy won about 30% support. But the SEC staff has since stepped out of the process. It stopped responding to companies’ no-action requests for the 2025–26 proxy season and in August 2026 made that policy permanent, leaving exclusion decisions to companies and their counsel. The Nvidia fallout may prompt more succession proposals, and may make companies think twice before excluding them, but for now shareholders are pressing the point without a referee. Nvidia’s investors, for their part, are going to court. A derivative suit filed November 11 accuses directors of ignoring red flags after the Times reported in October 2025 that Huang had socialized with Alice Huang. It seeks board reforms, including letting shareholders nominate at least four director candidates.
For other founder-led companies, the lesson is that succession planning can’t begin when a CEO suddenly leaves. Boards need to identify and develop potential successors, test their leadership capabilities and prepare for transitions that may come with little warning. A founder’s influence can be a tremendous corporate asset, but relying too heavily on one individual can also create governance risk. The question every board should be able to answer is the one Apple had already answered in 2011: who’s our Number 2?
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